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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THE VALUE OF 
THE PROCESS: THE CASE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Anis Qizilbash 
ABSTRACT 
In the current age of fiscal austerity, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) continue to be 
a dominating force as a policy tool to help plug widening funding gaps and deliver vital 
infrastructure. There is much debate over PPP models; risk allocation and financing. 
Partnerships UK is currently revaluating its Private Financing Initiative (PFI) model, 
questioning whether competitive dialogue brings value to the process. France recently 
announced PPPs worth €60bn to come to market in the coming decade, developing 
economies’ appetite for PPPs is increasing. According to a World Bank study Africa in 
particular needs around US$16.5 billion a year, to reach the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) for improved water access in Sub-Sahara Africa. When over 300 water 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) were evaluated, contract type mattered to some 
degree, but not significantly. There were reportedly exceptional increases in the number 
of connections after the private sector was involved, but without an increase in financial 
investment. If financing and contract type were not a significant game changer, how 
else can we explain success and failures of different PPPs? 
Keywords – Africa, process design, public-private partnerships, water 
INTRODUCTION 
This article aims to examine how the process design features and institutional frame-
works of successful PPPs might play a key role in determining the success of the policy 
instrument, by identifying and extrapolating the successful components. 
The piece begins with a brief look at characteristics and analysis of PPPs, then institu-
tional frameworks, before looking at how Bardach (Bardach, 2004) and Barzelay’s 
(Barzelay, 2007) process extrapolation and design analysis methods can be adapted for 
the study. This constitutes the foundation for analyzing the two case studies, Tanzania 
and Mozambique water PPPs. There is a discussion of possible reasons, addressing po-
litical, institutional, management and stakeholder involvement and arguing for the need 
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to evaluate the process by using a framework to examine the effects of the process con-
text factors and process design. 
Characteristics of successful partnerships 
For the basis of this article, the definition of PPP will be: 
Cooperation between public and private or NGO sector, to develop new ways of 
producing and delivering public services; sharing risks and rewards, where all 
parties, public, private and society, benefit from the transaction. (Hodge and 
Greve, 2007) 
 
This article defines PPP as a governance tool for government, because in all definitions, 
governance is the common denominator and requires unwavering political support in 
order to prop up the institutional frameworks, attract financing and private sector partic-
ipation to the table. A view supported by Vining and Boardman’s (Vining and Board-
man, 2008) first rule for government. This article will explore the process involved in 
bringing these elements together. 
Varying characteristics for effective partnerships have been asserted: Vining and 
Boardman (Vining and Boardman, 2008) suggest eight rules for government, Hodge 
and Greve (Hodge and Greve, 2007) explore financial, legal, risk transfer and political 
frames of PPPs focusing on OECD economies. Hailey finds that all parties have built 
rapport, learned about each organization’s strengths, needs and interests. Hailey’s study 
of successful characteristics leads to five principles: clarity of purpose, mutual trust and 
respect, investment of time and resources, negotiation of roles and responsibilities and 
long-term sustainability (Osborne, 2000). 
Benefits of PPP 
Partnering with the private sector enables governments to mobilize much needed in-
vestment. It essentially allows government to fund investments that are offset against 
future user fees, so it constitutes an alternative to government borrowing directly on the 
bond markets. It also taps into experience in operational, technological and managerial 
expertise from the private sector. PPPs present an opportunity to modernize existing 
operations, share costs, and achieve economies of scale. For developing economies, 
benefits accrue to establishing Southern ownership, better address interdependency and 
serves as a strategic management process tool (Hately, 1997). 
A further potential theoretical benefit of PPP is the supposed limited political interfer-
ence due to the separation of evaluation and administering agency, however this is a 
problematic assumption. PPP by definition involves the public sector, so it requires po-
litical intervention to make it work, which does not rule out political interference at all. 
Whether the benefit accrued depends on the process followed. 
Critique of PPP 
Limitations of contracting out public services in developing countries are: lack of capac-
ity and institutional weakness, widespread corruption and the private sector do not nec-
essarily introduce efficiency (Bangura and Larbi, 2006). In a development setting, po-
tential drawbacks include: poor regulatory environments and power imbalances between 
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partners, where one partner is the donor with greater expertise, financial and political 
power. If the private sector partner is based in the developed world and the government 
is based in the South, the government is likely to lack resources to offset disparities. 
There is also a strong feeling that international operators, participating in PPPs, enjoy 
profits and revenues, which do not stay in the host country, thereby shifting ownership 
away from the sovereign into international companies. Moreover, opportunities to de-
velop local capacity are lost when international operators are contracted and in addition, 
the loss of jobs to maintain efficiency is a popular trend in private sector participation. 
However, in the long-term, there is evidence to suggest that jobs were created as a result 
of innovation investment. 
Increased price of services is sometimes associated with private sector participation, 
excluding the poor from gaining access, when the PPP model is based on a revenue 
stream from service users. There are also examples of PPPs that have created construc-
tion cost over-runs, such as the case of the contract to maintain and repair London’s 
underground railway through a consortium called Metronet (see Vining and Boardman, 
2008). 
Institutional frameworks are a defining element that differentiates PPPs from other 
forms of public and private engagement to deliver services, which is why governance is 
crucial. If successfully managed, PPPs can be an effective way to mobilize private sec-
tor capital, develop a domestic private sector, and build capacity in government, which 
will ultimately deliver services to the public. 
PPP Institutional framework 
According to the OECD report (OECD, 2010), the functions of units created to manage 
PPPs vary across countries. Some provide policy guidance, technical support, capacity 
building, and direct funding for projects or promotion of PPP. Equally, jurisdictions and 
locations of PPPs differ between countries. They can be an independent agency, a cen-
tralized unit within the finance ministry or devolved within exclusive units on line minis-
tries. 
The independent model might be a government agency or commercial venture part or 
fully owned by the government. Potential drawbacks of this model include the conflict 
of interests between the public and private sector. The public sector is concerned with 
securing value for money, whereas private sector wants to maximize profit. There’s also 
a risk that the unit will promote PPPs simply to keep itself in existence. 
This article adopts OECD’s (2010) interpretation of a dedicated PPP unit: 
Any organization set up with full or partial aid of the government to ensure that 
necessary capacity to create, support and evaluate multiple public-private partner-
ship agreements is made available and clustered together within government. 
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For and Against Dedicated PPP Unit. 
Arguments for dedicated PPP unit Arguments against dedicated PPP 
unit 
Separation of policy formulation and pro-
ject implementation. 
PPP policy can be made by same au-
thority as traditional procurement. 
 
Dedicated unit may not separate policy 
formulation and implementation if it 
can directly fund PPP projects. 
Pooling expertise and experience within 
government can help with project prepara-
tion, negotiation and implementation. Cost 
savings for government. 
Knowledge can be attained by internal 
and external advisors appointed by 
individual ministries. 
Standardization of procurement proce-
dures. 
 
Finance & planning ministries as well 
as line ministries have expertise in 
assessing cost-benefits of projects. 
Budgetary consideration of projects. 
 
When a unit is closer to the political 
leadership, it is more receptive to polit-
ical bias when selecting PPP projects. 
Political will and trust. 
 
Signals approval of PPP as policy tool 
and may weaken the case for other 
procurement methods. 
Source: OECD (2010), PPP Institutional survey. 
Turning to the case studies, the following provides a guide on how the process from the 
successful case study can be extrapolated and serve as a learning experience for the 
failed project. 
Data sample 
For the data sample, purposive sampling was used to locate specific information of con-
trasting cases. The basis for choosing a success referred back to Hodge et al (Hodge and 
Greve, 2005) definition of PPPs: public, private and consumer should all win. Addition-
ally, due to constraints of this article, limits for cases were set to ensure there was ample 
information to compare the central issue of study, the process. A case study on Mozam-
bique was retrieved from the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Fa-
cility (PPIAF) for a success story. 
Water projects are amongst the least successful PPPs, so it is valuable to examine a suc-
cessful and less successful water example, to isolate the causes from differences be-
tween sectors. It could be argued that this study is sectoral specific therefore cannot be 
generalised but as institutional frameworks are impacted by changes in political land-
scape, as demonstrated in the OECD study (OECD, 2010), a sectoral study should not 
affect the analysis of the process. 
Whilst there were initial problems, the Mozambique PPP turned out to be a success. It 
achieved strong growth; increased access from 56,000 in 2007 to 95,000 in 2009 num-
ber of connections, which means consumers were benefiting from increased access. A 
high collection rate was achieved in some systems and falling non-revenue water 
(NRW), which was a win for the government and private sector. Government of 
Mozambique (GOM) achieved its policy objectives and the project was up-scaled and 
still in operation. For these reasons, it qualified as a success. 
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Finding the failure was not as easy due to the lack of published in-depth story to study 
the process. In the end, a study of Tanzania (McKague and Bransei, 2007) was selected. 
The private sector was losing money, investments promised were not made, consumers 
were unhappy and government was not achieving its policy objectives: the project was 
terminated after only two years. 
After comparing both case studies and deriving theoretical explanations for the out-
comes, an attempt is made to extrapolate the process design features. 
Analysis 
Analyses methods from Bardach (Bardach, 2004) and Barzelay (Barzelay, 2007) have 
been adopted as both have studied process design and how to learn from them. 
It will begin by mapping the PPP process for each case; identify what are believed to be 
the mechanisms serving as the driving force behind the success. A key candidate for 
replication is “causal mechanism”; mechanisms that set causes in motion producing the 
desired effects. In order to determine whether the mechanisms warrant extrapolation, 
examining the contingent features of each mechanism follows this. Three categories are 
borrowed to identify them (Bardach, 2004). First its' implementing features: essential 
functional roles that directly implements essential mechanisms, such as political will. A 
question to ask would be: what were the basic mechanisms and the implementing fea-
tures of these basic mechanisms. The second category is optional features: they differ 
according to local preferences and constraints and unlike implementing features; they 
do not play a primary role. For example the level of government or PPP model for de-
livery. And finally, supportive features: those that help bring the implementing features 
into existence, such as the institutional frameworks. 
Conceptualisation 
To conceptualise the causal mechanisms, three data categories for process design analy-
sis will be applied (Barzelay, 2007): process design features, process context factors 
and participation. The rationale here is that the social mechanisms are said to be stimu-
lated within the context of these processes. Since a person is a product of their environ-
ment, analysis of the process context that activated social mechanisms, and not the 
mechanisms itself, will suffice within the parameters of this article. The process design 
features include: ideas, governance and structural events. Process context factors in-
clude: institutions, ideas, policy development and political streams. 
Barzalay argues that there is a causal claim, creating an outcome, activated by three 
social mechanisms: actor certification, attribution of opportunity and performance 
feedback. The logic behind this is that each mechanism has a compound effect to cause 
a chain of events. Due to the limited scope of this article and short supply of instrumen-
tal, in-depth case studies, this will be excluded from the analysis. Moreover, discussing 
the contingent features, as proposed by Bardach, should serve the purpose of extracting 
causal mechanisms for analysis. 
This method will be used to extrapolate the process of the successful study. A simple 
representation of these will appear in a table after mapping out the process. 
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Map the PPP procurement cycle 
 Bardach’s contingent features 
 Barzalay’s three data categories for analysing process 
CASE EXAMPLES 
Tanzania’s failure 
Why was this PPP a failure? After two years of dispute between the government of 
Tanzania (GOT) and a private operator, the government terminated the contract due to 
under-delivery. And there were disputes between the private and public sector, where 
the private operator withheld payments to the public sector in an attempt to renegotiate 
the contract. 
Backdrop 
Tanzania’s population more than tripled from 1976 to 2004, reaching around 37 million, 
a period where very little was done to improve the water and sewer systems. With cen-
tralised water provision the government was responsible for financing, maintenance and 
expansion of water services. Only 50,000 homes were connected to the city’s water 
supply, with up to 1 million people sourcing water from neighbours with a connection. 
Customers with connection were typically middle or upper class households; only a few 
wealthy households were required to pay for water. The government made water freely 
available for everyone else; however Dar es Salaam’s slums mostly lacked water ser-
vice. In Tameke, the largest slum, most of the 1 million residents sourced water from 
wells, community kiosks or hand carted sellers. 
Since gaining independence in 1961, Tanzania was a one party state until holding its 
first multi-party elections in 1995. The first elected leader, President Nyerere, adopted a 
socialist model for economic development. Businesses were nationalised and the gov-
ernment initiated large-scale centrally planned projects to provide services. Whilst it 
was an economic disaster (McKague and Bransei, 2007), the socialist model was crucial 
in constructing a unified, peaceful nation. After the 1980’s economic crises, Govern-
ment of Tanzania (GOT) signed a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and initiated a journey of comprehensive condition-
al recovery programmes. 
Reforms 
The reforms included rationalisation of government employment, local and regional 
government administration reform, efficiency and management reform. 
Water Partnerships for Dar es Salaam emerged from Tanzania’s Minister of Water, Ed-
ward Lowassa’s leadership in 2002, in a bid to improve Tanzania’s aging water infra-
structure. The deal was seen as the most ambitious in Africa’s water sector. Success 
would have great implications to attract investors to Africa and provide a model to rep-
licate. The US$165 million loan for the project financing deal was led by the World 
Bank with US$61.5m; accompanied the by the African Development Bank US$48m, 
European Investment Bank US$34m, Government of Tanzania US$12.6m and a private 
company US$8.5m. The conditional loan required GOT to procure an international wa-
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ter utility operator as the service provider and to form a consortium with a Tanzanian 
company. 
The loan was dispersed to the government to restore existing water facilities, improve 
access, reduce water loss, develop community water service for poor and under-served, 
upgrade commercial operations whilst reducing illegal tapping and enhance tariff col-
lections. 
Process 
In 2002 a new water policy was strengthened, based on the following code: role of gov-
ernment shifts from provider to regulator; decentralise planning, implementation and 
management of services to the lowest administrative level; incorporate private sector in 
service delivery; cost recovery; demand led with community ownership and manage-
ment. The existing water utility provider, Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority 
(DAWASA), was given a new mandate to own existing and future water system assets 
and managed day-to-day operation of the water system. 
During the international competitive bidding process, three companies participated, with 
two of them dropping out at the final stage. The remaining bidder, City Water Services 
Ltd, was awarded the 10-year lease contract in February 2003. The consortium was a 
Tanzanian registered private water operator led by Bi-Water, GauffIngenieure, and a 
Tanzanian company, Superdoll Trailer Manufacturers. 
A lease contract was adopted where the private sector was tasked with operating and 
maintaining water and sewage infrastructure, billing and collection of fees, thereby 
bearing all the commercial risk. The Minister of Water and Livestock Development was 
responsible for negotiation and implementation on behalf of GOT; and regulation until 
regulating body Energy and Water Utility Regulatory Authority (EWURA) was formed. 
The terms of the lease were enforced in August 2003 and set out the following direc-
tives: DAWASA retained full ownership of all fixed assets of the water utility while 
City Water operated and maintained DAWASA; DAWASA was responsible for financ-
ing and developing water supply; the international utility had to partner with a Tanzani-
an company; City Water was awarded two US$9million contracts for procurement and 
installation of water meters and water plant equipment, which were crucial components 
of the contract to enable City Water to start raising revenue. And finally, City Water 
was to employ DAWASA’s 1,400 employees, bill DAWASA’s 50,000 household cus-
tomers at a specified rate and collect fees. 
City Water was paid by revenue collection from customers, keeping the ‘lifeline’ 
amount, which was the discounted rate. Anything over the discounted rate was paid to 
DAWASA to cover operating costs, servicing debt and investment opportunities. 
When the contract was underway, City Water perceived it to be flexible and negotiable 
whereas DAWASA observed the terms to be strictly followed and binding. For exam-
ple: as soon as City Water began running, they sought to revise technical and revenue 
terms of the lease, having established the advanced level of disrepair. They were unsuc-
cessful in this bid. 
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A year after the lease came into effect, City Water began withholding their monthly fee 
owed to DAWASA in an attempt to bring them to the negotiating table and coerce the 
local partner to pay their equity share. 
In June 2005 the Minister of Water unilaterally terminated the contract with City Water 
on the grounds that it failed to meet performance targets specified on the contract. Fol-
lowing this, a new government owned entity was formed: Dar es Salaam Water and 
Sewerage Corporation, to take over from City Water and EWURA finally came into 
effect in 2006. 
We will now move to examine the successful programme. 
Mozambique’s success 
The Government of Mozambique introduced a Delegated Management Framework 
(DMF) in 1998, which separated asset management from operations. Asset management 
was the responsibility of the autonomous public agency (FIPAG) and operations was 
contracted out to private sector. The contract championed recouping full tariff cost for 
water supply. Additionally, the Water Supply Regulatory Council (CRA) was formed 
with a mandate to regulate tariffs, ensuring economic sustainability and customer satis-
faction. 
There were problems in the beginning where devastating floods caused severe setbacks 
causing the lead private sector partner to drop out and sell their share. A new contract 
was immediately put into place. Consumers benefited from increased access to water. In 
2000, none of FIPAG’s customers received 24 hours access to water, whereas in 2007, 
water was available 24 hours a day in three districts, 22 hours per day in 1 other and 14 
hours per day in another district (Triche, 2008). Collection of user fees ratio increased to 
over 90%. Financial performance in four provincial capitals steadily improved, where in 
some regions there was negative operating income, the revenues were growing faster 
than costs. Tariff increase was minimal, after 5 years, investment started nearing break-
even, meaning the private partner was able to begin servicing debt. The delegated-
management contract was scaled up to meet needs of an additional 9 cities. 
Backdrop 
Since the mid 1970s, war ravaged Mozambique had experienced very little investment 
in the decayed water supply infrastructure. Since independence in 1975, Mozambique 
had a single-party system lead by Frelimo. 
Mozambique is now a multi-party democracy, with its first general election in Decem-
ber 1999. According to domestic and international observers, there was a high voter-
turnout, which suggests a participative population. It was a closely run contest where 
the Frelimo party won. 
Reforms 
In 1991 the Water Law was enacted, just before the end of the civil war; this was fol-
lowed by the inauguration of the National Water Policy in 1992. In 1998 the DMF was 
created in a bid to introduce sweeping institutional reforms to develop, regulate and 
deliver urban water supply. The policy included the creation of two independent public 
bodies: an asset management agency with authority to contract operators Fund for In-
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vestment and Ownership of Water Supply Assets (FIPAG), and an independent regula-
tor, Water Supply Regulatory Council of Mozambique (CRA). 
FIPAG’s mandate was to represent the State and act as the custodian of water supply 
assets in designated areas, manage financing and investment of water supply, award and 
supervise contracts with private providers in designated areas and temporarily operate 
services not yet transferred to private operators. A Performance Contract was signed by 
FIPAG and Ministry of Public Works and Housing whereby government obligations 
were to facilitate payment of water bills by government agencies and allowing discon-
nection in the result of non-payment by private or public parties. 
The National Water Directorate (DNA) was responsible for water at the national level, 
while five Regional Water Administrators (ARAs) were responsible for regional. How-
ever under the reforms, DNA’s mandate was reduced to focus on water policy and stra-
tegic guidance, whilst decentralising its operational activities to FIPAG. 
DMF centralised responsibility of FIPAG with a view to eventually decentralise to mu-
nicipalities after developing infrastructure and capacity. In the interim, municipalities 
participated in planning and monitoring through a Stakeholders Forum. 
In 1995 the Government adopted a National Water Policy based on the following prin-
ciples: increased access to water for the population, notably the poor and rural popula-
tion; create financial sustainability and boost cost-recovery; reduce role of State in set-
ting standards and priorities; promoting development; regulating and investing in infra-
structure and delivery of services by independent companies or private operators. 
The World Bank, African Development Bank, European Investment Bank financed it 
through loan instruments, and Government of Netherlands, French Development Agen-
cy and several others, in donations, totalling US$450 million for investment, operational 
support and technical assistance to FIPAG from 1999 to 2007. A further US$8million 
was pledged to provide CRA support to develop the regulatory framework. 
Process 
International and local consulting firms prepared tender documents and four interna-
tional companies were pre-qualified to bid. Selection was based on technical and finan-
cial with financial scores based on net present value of four criteria. In the end, three 
submitted bids and in 1999, FIPAG awarded a US$25million contract in two parts to 
AdeM: a 15 year lease to operate water and distribution for Maputo and a 5 year man-
agement contract to operate water and distribution in four other cities. AdeM was con-
sortium led by French private operator SAUR (38.5%), IPE-Aguas de Portugal (31.5%) 
and five national investment organisations MAZI Mocambique (30%). In 2000, CRA 
began operating. 
AdeM’s bid was to provide delegated works and management of water supply opera-
tions, maintenance, financial and commercial management and commercial success of 
investment programmes. The tasks included design, preparation of tenders and supervi-
sion of capital works projects, rehabilitation, replacement of networks, operating 
equipment, meters and damaged connections. Their financing obligations were limited 
to providing maintenance and working capital; compensation was arranged at a fixed 
rate per m3 of water. New customer connection fees were paid to FIPAG and a monthly 
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‘regulation levy’ was paid to CRA. The contract allowed for reviews of tariffs every 
five years and interim reviews under exceptional circumstances. 
Terms of the lease required FIPAG to transfer assets in Maputo and Matola to AdeM for 
use and care during the contract term. Delegating both the management and operational 
aspects to AdeM was called to question and there were delays in achieving operational 
efficiency. 
FIPAG paid for AdeM to carry out delegated works, such as replacing meters and dam-
aged connections during the first five years, after which all meters were to be replaced 
at AdeM’s expense. Construction of new connections, renewal of distribution mains and 
pipes were FIPAG’s expense for the duration of the contract. FIPAG continued respon-
sibility for approving investment program and financing capital investments. AdeM 
outlined annual investment programmes and was compensated 1.2% of the value of 
programme. 
Staffs were transferred to AdeM, who assumed responsibility for all staff related costs, 
could not be terminated during first year of contract. 
Severe flooding strained performance of the contract resulting in the lead private opera-
tor SAUR withdrawing in 2001 and causing near-bankruptcy of AdeM. Aguas de Por-
tugal purchased SAUR’s share. 
Strong leadership and political support helped sustain reforms. Donors discussed with 
FIPAG to launch new tender, but they decided not to as it was unlikely to attract ac-
ceptable competition and avoid further delays. 
In 2001 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between AdeM and 
FIPAG to continue operating whilst the new contract was being renegotiated. Consumer 
tariffs were not increased to reflect increased operator’s rate, so the Government subsi-
dised it during a 23 month MOU period. MOU period was an opportunity to improve 
governance and supervision. CRA’s role to approve customer contracts became more 
exact. 
In 2004 FIPAG signed a revised 15-year contract that included raised fees and proposed 
improvements in framing the service obligations and procedures, with a restructured 
AdeM. Additionally the four original contracts were consolidated into one to maximise 
economies of scale and an independent auditor to monitor operator’s performance and 
updated targets were introduced. 2008 saw key capital investments completed and cov-
erage was expected to increase. 
The Government remained committed to the reform and maintained independence of 
the CRA and FIPAG, which earned respect amongst stakeholders. To that end, the CRA 
balanced conflicting objectives of protecting consumers by monitoring satisfaction lev-
els, resolving complaints and improving services for poor, advocating efficiency, whilst 
allowing FIPAG to realise financial sustainability. And FIPAG was in a position to start 
servicing its debt. National Directorate of Water (DNA) focuses on policy and strategic 
guidance, while decentralising and deconcentrating implementation to FIPAG. 
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EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
The next part of this article contrasts the cases, grouping them into Political, Institu-
tional, Management and Stakeholder categories and seeking theoretical explanations as 
to why each PPP worked as it did. 
Political 
In both cases, the political context appeared to be a determining factor in the success 
and failure. GOT approached elections during the second year of implementation. One 
could reasonably assume GOT was motivated to reverse support of the reform in favour 
of the electorate in order to secure re-election. This would explain the sudden shift in 
sentiment and lack of commitment. An ODI study supports this assertion “(the Tanzani-
an Government) are more contented with winning elections” (ODI, 2007). 
GOM remained committed to the reforms and supported the partnership project despite 
catastrophic flooding, even after one of the private sector players had to drop out. They 
demonstrated decisive management despite slight pressure from the donor community 
to put the project back to tender, which would have caused more delays. 
How could political interference be eliminated from a policy that requires strong politi-
cal support in order to succeed in the first place? The comparison suggests a political 
compound of the public-choice theory, which holds a motivational assumption that each 
party will act to prevail over the other to stay in power (Udehn, 1996). This application 
is discarded, because public choice theory suggests bureaucrats aim to enlarge budgets, 
however, in a PPP context, it requires them to control less money and fewer staff. On 
the contrary, it could be said that taking on more debt is another way of expanding 
budgets and therefore still sits within the realm of self-interest. So basically whatever a 
politician decides is explained as being in self-interest. Again, this does not fit, because 
practically speaking there are too many external influences at play, namely donor influ-
ence to enable the politician to gain preferences. 
It is important to separate the functions of politicians and government institutions. Cor-
rupt politicians will have greater opportunity to act with self-interest when the correct 
institutions of government are not in place. 
Institutional 
A centralised government was instrumental in driving Mozambique’s policy forward. 
Even though it was a delegated management framework, the asset management, con-
tract management, operational issues and regulatory body were managed centrally, so 
was the formation of institutional architecture. 
However, in Tanzania’s case, a legal infrastructure was missing, as was monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms to hold the private sector and government accountable for 
the failed project and wasted money. Donors continued to provide more money after the 
project failed. There was also a high volume of customers tapping into the water supply 
without paying and legal customers who were not paying their bills. GOT was aware of 
this and failed to implement the legal or regulatory frameworks to support the collection 
process and ultimately ensure success of the programme. To mitigate this, City Water 
took legal action against both groups, but neither approach worked to reduce water loss 
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or increase revenues. Illegal tapping of water continued and there were a large number 
of payment delinquencies. 
Efficiency gains are a key benefit of neo-classical policies. Under normal conditions of 
competition, it could be expected to catalyse efficiency and therefore driving prices 
down. For this mechanism to work, significant choice in supplier is required, which was 
lacking in Tanzania’s case, where out of three interested parties, two dropped out. Un-
der these conditions, it would have been prudent for GOT to raise inquiries why the 
other two dropped out and then pressed the restart button to attract more bidders. 
Whereas Mozambique’s government successfully installed an independent regulator, 
from the beginning, mandated to balance the conflicting objectives of ensuring govern-
ment were meeting their financial goals whilst securing fair pricing for customers. 
Management 
Contract management methods differed. GOT treated the contract as set-in-stone while 
the private sector considered it negotiable, which underpinned an on-going conflict. The 
private sector withheld payment in an attempt to renegotiate terms. GOT’s lack of flexi-
bility was evident in the procurement of water pumps. City Water advised GOT that the 
water pumps were unsuitable and proposed a different approach. GOT declined the pro-
posal, insisting on abiding to contract specifications. The water meters turned out to be 
unsuitable for the low-water pressure environment, which impacted the accuracy in wa-
ter billing. This scenario mirrors the Metronet case, pointed out by Vining et al (Vining 
and Boardman, 2008), where conflicting interpretations on the fundamental nature of 
the contract emerged. 
GOM was more flexible and factored it into the terms of the lease, developing clarity 
from the beginning. 
Superdoll Trailer Manufacturer, the local private company forming part of the private 
partnership in GOT’s case, failed to contribute their share of the equity instalment and 
neither was it enforced by the regulators. 
Imperfect due diligence was performed by City Water. According to the report, their 
initial bid was based on information provided by Tanzanian government and World 
Bank. Revenue expectations set by City Water did not meet forecasts, therefore affected 
the financial viability of the project. 
Notwithstanding failures within the private sector operator and the relative inexperience 
on the government of Mozambique’s part, GOM maintained support from the donors, 
interest from private sector and successfully arranged delivery of water services to con-
sumers. Also, public and private sectors shared the goal of financial sustainability. So it 
was in GOM’s interest to secure effective collection mechanisms were in place to en-
sure financial goals were met. This was aided by the CRA. 
Unlike Tanzania, flexibility was built into the terms of the lease enabling all parties to 
conduct interim reviews. Regular monitoring and evaluation empowered FIPAG keep 
informed and make changes to strengthen governance and improve contracts when 
needed. 
The issues underscoring contracting stems from New Institutional Economics (NIE), a 
branch of neo-liberal economics, where NIE challenges the dominant part played by 
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markets, and presents instruments to arrange institutional design. NIE begins from a 
view that information is rarely complete and opposes the notion of individualism, pre-
sented by neo-liberalism, instead, argues that individuals have different motivations and 
behavior. William Ouchi (Ouchi, 1980) suggests market failures occur due to the im-
possibility of stating every possible future event resulting in incomplete contracts, pro-
ducing high transaction costs. This is especially the case when there’s high ambiguity in 
performance measurement or lack of goal congruence. This can be remedied by ‘clan’ 
mechanisms: reciprocity, legitimate authority and common values and beliefs (Ouch, 
1980). 
As Coase (Coase, 1937) pointed out in his seminal article on New Institutional Econom-
ics, “operation of the market costs something”, therefore transactions have costs associ-
ated to them, such as finding out information, negotiating, monitoring and administering 
them. In NIE, institutions are formed to reduce uncertainty and therefore viewed as piv-
otal to the outcome of efficient markets. 
Lessons from NIE can help guide decision-making in service delivery. 
Stakeholder involvement 
And finally, the culture of Mozambique probably played a huge part, from a governance 
and civil society standpoint. First of all, Mozambique was undergoing a massive privat-
isation, which was part of the structural adjustment conditional loans from the IMF. So 
they had dealings with private sector before. GOT on the other hand, was relatively nov-
ice at working with the private sector, requiring higher levels of accountability than 
dealing with donors. 
Culturally, Tanzanians, especially from rural areas, believed water to be freely coming 
from the heavens, expecting government to provide their basic needs. Furthermore, the 
approach adopted by City Water to collect revenues was perceived as confrontational. 
Given Tanzania’s history of socialist rule and Minister Lowassa’s assessment, the man-
ner of City Water’s dealings with the public was perceived as being aggressive. 
Part of the contract involved City Water acquiring DAWASA’s former employees. As a 
result, there was a discrepancy in pay between former DAWASA employees and the 
expatriate workers from City Water, creating grievances amongst the population. More-
over, the local partner, Superdoll Trailer Manufacturer (STM) wanted a more active role 
in managing City Water; however, CEO was apprehensive about this fearing STM’s 
lack of utility management experience. 
Government telling the private sector what to do, in the case of procuring and installing 
water meters, in an area where the private sector should have been able to use their bet-
ter judgement. 
Several commentators recognize the importance of personal relationships (e.g. Osborne 
2000). In operational reality, this means identifying the impact of personal and cultural 
biases, the motives of participants and their objectives. Also it requires identifying 
where conflict may arise from imbalances of power and resources, and coherence on 
expectations of the partnership, and the roles and responsibilities of participants. 
Mozambique’s success story certainly is not a textbook success case, without setbacks. 
There were bumps in the beginning, problems within the private sector’s camp and sub-
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sequent changes in private sector operators. However, the outcome was an increase in 
connections, overall customer satisfaction, strong political and donor support, profit was 
made and the DMF was scaled up to other cities. 
In summary, Tanzania’s PPP failed due to lack of consistent political support, poor in-
stitutional frameworks, weak contract management and absence of effective stakeholder 
management: the entire process was incapacitated. These are all the things that Mozam-
bique got more or less right. 
Having eliminated public choice and new institutional economy theories as the cause 
for the failures and that perhaps the institutional arrangements may have instigated a 
positive environment. The next portion will explore how to extrapolate GOM’s process. 
VALUE OF THE PROCESS 
Lessons for PPP’s in infrastructure 
In order to provide guidelines to extrapolating the process, Mozambique’s process fea-
tures were extracted and plugged into following framework; created by blending 
Bardach’s suggestions with Barzalay’s process design analysis. 
Process features of Mozambique’s PPP 
 
According to this framework, the effects of the process design features were supported 
by the process context factors, so the columns on the left and right helped create the 
effects in the middle column. So starting from the right hand column, for example, cre-
ating an independent regulator for consumers and private sector operators, with the 
guiding idea of full-cost-recovery, reinforced the governance arrangements to discon-
Contingent Features Process Design Features Process Context Factors 
Implementing features 
Governance, centralised gov-
ernment, stakeholder forum, 
competition, full cost recovery, 













PPP model, institutional 
framework, political will, cul-
tural context 
Ideas: increased access to water, 
accountability, regulating services, 
capacity building, contract man-
agement approach – flexibility, 
improved management processes  
Governance responsibilities of 
CRA – protecting consumers and 
ensuring economic sustainability, 
and FIPAG – approving and financ-
ing investment programmes, man-
agement continuity, disconnection 
of service in event of non-payment 
Structural events FIPAG im-
proved specifying and monitoring 
performance targets monthly and 
annually, sustained donor support, 
private sector participation,  
CRA managing customer experi-
ence, planning and oversight meet-
ings, CRA and FIPAG conducting 
seminars to municipalities 
Institutions presidency, establish-
ing separate independent asset 
management (FIPAG) and regulato-
ry body (CRA), Ministry of Public 
Works and Housing, Stakeholder 
Forum, personnel training 
Ideas Water reforms, competition, 
long-term financial sustainability, 
full cost-recovery  
Policy development water reform, 
promote development of decentral-
ised, financially viable services, 
subsidised access to poor 
Political stream political will, 
commitment to reforms 
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nect delinquent payments. This was also supported by the full-cost recovery and finan-
cial sustainability context ideas. The earlier discussion showed how GOT failed to im-
plement any cost recovery mechanisms, which had detrimental effect on the financial 
viability. So creating an independent regulatory body before partnerships are imple-
mented could have eliminated some of the challenges faced by City Water while pro-
tecting customers’ interests. 
Taking a long-term view on partnerships was an essential catalyst for management con-
tinuity, developing a continuous improvement mindset on planning, customer service 
and adopting a flexible approach to contract management. In addition, institutional ar-
rangements and financial viability created an environment where actors ensured the 
programme was a success. It also reinforced the commitment of donors, whilst main-
taining the interest of the private sector. 
Political will was the cause that created the desired effect of delivering the necessary 
institutional frameworks and commitment to reforms despite massive setbacks and ef-
fective stakeholder engagement. 
Mozambique was effective at stakeholder engagement. The stakeholder forum was a 
mechanism to keep the donors informed. It enabled FIPAG and CRA to meet regularly 
and municipalities to be engaged and receive training, therefore building capacity and 
an enabling environment for local ownership. CRA was also effective in maintaining a 
harmonious relationship with customers. GOT’s issue was the cultural context where 
water was previously free, so there was discontent amongst civil society. Had the Min-
ster added a public education campaign or gained the support of community leaders, it 
could have subverted opposition to the reform. 
One could argue that the delegated management contract underpinned success, where 
the key characteristic was the separation of asset management from operations, with 
both entities operating as autonomous public units and thus eliminating exposure to po-
litical interference. However both governments were centralised, so this would not nec-
essarily relieve it from political distortion. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The PPP model could be a supportive feature, though there is not enough evidence to 
suggest this. A comparison with additional successful PPP models would be required to 
draw this conclusion. This article supports adopting a process analysis method to pro-
vide some guidance as to how to extrapolate the process. 
PPP serves as a governance tool formalising partnerships between stakeholders. Gov-
ernance involves economics, institutional frameworks, strong political support, as well 
as managing a process. Therefore it is required to implement necessary accountability 
measures in order for it to succeed. This could serve as a causal mechanism to shape 
attitudes of the international investment community, private sectors and civil society. 
The idea suggests permanence. 
Anis Qizilbash is Director of Global Development Innovation, London, UK. E-mail: 
aq@gdinnovation.co.uk 
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The process context factors, such as the institutional architecture supports the process 
design features: ideas, governance and events, that maintained the success of the PPP in 
GOM’s case. Using Vining and Boardman’s guidelines on the Eight Rules for Govern-
ment (Vining and Boardman, 2008), could be added: conduct a thorough stakeholders 
mapping exercise, as it is vital to recognise the key actors, their incentives and interests 
in reforms and how they might influence the process. Additionally, public engagement 
combined with a continued public education campaign, before and during implementa-
tion. A flexible approach to contract management can aid cost-recovery, as during im-
plementation, the private sector is best placed to make recommendations on allocation 
of resources and the contract should reflect this. These will serve to support the process 
context factors. 
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